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Introduction 
Inflation  is defined  as a sustained  increase  in the 
general  price  level  over  time.  It  generally  rises  in- 
sidiously,  building  up  momentum  over  a period  of 
time.  One  economist  has  observed,  “inflation  is like 
a  slow  curve  ball;  why  is  it  so  deceptive?”  As  this 
article  will  show,  in  the  past  even  the  best  of 
forecasters  were  often  unable  to  foresee  an upswing 
in  the  inflation  rate. 
This  article  examines  the  quality  of  inflation 
forecasts  in the  1972-82  period,  which  contained  two 
episodes  of  especially  virulent  inflation.  Special 
attention  is  given  to  the  periodic  forecasts  of  two 
prominent  forecasting  services,  the  consensus  of 
quarterly  forecasts  published  annually  by this  Bank1 
during  the  seventies,  and  the  Greenbook2 forecasts 
made  by  the  staff  of the  Board  of  Governors  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System.  The  Greenbook forecasts 
provide  a particularly  good  vehicle  for  the  study  as 
they  were:  1) as good  or better  than  other  forecasts, 
2) consistent,  3) published  regularly  and  often,  and 
4)  generated  primarily  for  policy  briefings,  which 
meant  that  one  of  their  major  interests  was  the 
outlook  for  inflation.  The  analysis  will show  that  all 
of  the  forecasters  had  difficulty  in predicting  rising 
inflation. 
An  examination  of  the  successes  and  failures  of 
inflation  forecasting  in  the  seventies  is  especially 
relevant  now,  for  there  has  been  considerable  con- 
cern  recently  that  inflationary  pressures  are  mount- 
ing again.  Those  who  argue  that  inflation  is heating 
up  point  to  the  more  rapid  increases  in commodity 
* The author  wishes  to  thank  the  members  of  the  Research 
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1 The  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Richmond  published  summaries 
of major  economic  forecasts  at the  beginning  of each  year  over 
the  1953-86  time  period.  The  Bank  began  to  publish  details  of 
major  quarter-by-quarter  forecasts  in the  1972 Business Forecasts 
booklet.  The  table  showing  the  consensus  (median)  forecast  was 
first  published  in  the  1973  Business Forecasts booklet. 
2 The  Greenbooks  are  briefing  documents  prepared  by  the  staff 
of the  Board  of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System  prior 
to  each  meeting  of  the  FOMC.  They  are  distributed  to  the 
Presidents  of the  regional  Banks  as well as to the  Governors  and 
senior  staff  of the  Board.  The  Greenbooks  are  highly  confidential 
at  the  time  of  their  release,  and  are  available  to  the  public 
(excepting  some  sensitive  international  material)  after  a  five- 
year  lag. 
prices  and  consumer  prices  as well  as to  the  rising 
rates  of utilization  of capital and labor thus far in 1988. 
Information  of the  kind  presented  here  should  be 
useful  in  reminding  the  reader  of  the  serious  infla- 
tion  problem  the  nation  faced  on  two  occasions  in 
the  seventies.  The  annual  rate  of increase  of the  im- 
plicit  deflator  for GNP  during  1972-74  rose  from  an 
average  of 3.6  percent  in the  first half of  1972 to  14.3 
percent  in the  third  quarter  of  1974,  and  the  annual 
rate  of increase  of the  deflator  in the  1976-80  period 
rose  from  an average  of  5.0  percent  in the  first  half 
of  1976 to  12.1 percent  in the fourth  quarter  of 1980. 
Yet,  consistent  with  inflation’s  insidious  nature,  the 
severity  of the  underlying  inflation  risk was not  fully 
recognized  in  the  early  stages  of  either  of  these 
episodes. 
This  article  is not  able to specify  the  exact  sources 
of error  in recognizing  and  forecasting  the  inflation 
of  the  seventies,  but  it  does  suggest  some  possi- 
bilities.  These  include:  1)  the  inability  to  foresee 
supply  shocks  (particularly  oil shocks),  2) the  diffi- 
culty  of modeling  the  inflationary  process,  and  3) the 
tendency  for actual money  growth  to exceed  its target 
range  in  the  seventies. 
Theories  of Inflation 
As  a  preliminary,  it  may  be  useful  to  review 
briefly  the  theories  of inflation  prevalent  during  the 
period  (1972-82)  covered  by this  article.  One  of the 
most  popular  intermediate  macroeconomic  theory 
texts  of the  1960s,  Gardner  Ackley’s  Macroeconomic 
Theory, defined  inflation  in approximately  the way that 
it  is  defined  now,  namely,  a  “.  .  .  persistent  and 
appreciable  rise  in  the  general  level  or  average  of 
prices”  [1, p.  421].  Ackley  divided  inflation  into  three 
basic  types,  demand  inflation,  cost  inflation,  and 
some  combination  of  the  two.  Demand  inflation 
denoted  the  classical  type  of inflationary  process  in 
which  price  increases  came  in  response  to  excess 
aggregate  demand.3  Cost  inflation  came  about  as a 
result  of  the  power  of  various  groups,  e.g.,  labor 
unions,  large  firms,  trade  associations,  etc.,  to  raise 
wages  and  prices  even  in  the  absence  of  excess 
demand  for  their  goods  or  services. 
3 Aggregate  demand  is  composed  of  the  demand  for  the 
economy’s  output  of goods  and  services  by consumers,  investors, 
government,  and  foreigners. 
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folded  into  a more  general  supply  shock  theory  of 
inflation.  According  to  this  theory,  some  event  or 
another,  such  as  a union-induced  wage  increase,  a 
crop  failure,  a fuel  shortage,  etc.,  would  restrict  ag- 
gregate  supply  and,  by  causing  a shortage,  lead  to 
an  increase  in  prices. 
Supply  shock  theories  can  explain  a  change  in 
relative  prices  or  a one-time  rise  in the  price  level, 
but  they  fall  short  as  explanations  of  inflation  (de- 
fined,  remember,  as a series  of continuing rises  in the 
general  price  level).  There  is an  inherent  inconsis- 
tency  in  a theory  that  explains  a continuing  rise  in 
prices  by  a  series  of  apparently  unrelated  random 
events,  and  this  inconsistency  has  led  to  a decline 
in the  use  of supply  shocks  as explanations  of infla- 
tion.  The  failure  of  anti-cost-push  policies  such  as 
wage  and  price  controls  and  wage/price  guidelines 
to stop  the  inflation  of the  seventies  also contributed 
to  the  decline  in the  usage  of supply  shock  theories 
of  inflation. 
Supply  shock  explanations  of  inflation,  however, 
were  utilized  heavily  in  the  seventies  and  early 
eighties.  The  typical  inflation  forecast  frequently 
enumerated  a variety  of  supply  factors4  that  would 
be  likely  to  affect  inflation  in the  near-term  future. 
Such  forecasts  implied  that  inflation  would  subside 
naturally  once  the  effects  of the  special  factors  had 
worked  themselves  out.  If,  however,  the  economy 
was  actually  plagued  by  a  general  inflation,  each 
“special  factor”  would  be  succeeded  by  another,  and 
the  longer-term  inflationary  process  would  be  seen 
as  a  succession  of  special  situations. 
Milton  Friedman  observed  that  “Inflation  is, always 
and  everywhere,  a  monetary  phenomenon,  pro- 
duced  in the  first instance  by an unduly  rapid  growth 
in the  quantity  of money”  [4, p.  39).  His  now-famous 
statement  has  been  generally  accepted  by  the 
economics  profession.  This  conception  of  inflation 
implies  that  excess  money  growth  is the  source  of 
excess  aggregate  demand,  and it implicitly  denies  the 
relevance  of  supply  shocks  as  sources  of  inflation 
(defined  again  as  a continuing  increase  in  the  price 
level). 
Inflation Forecasts 
This  section  presents  the  forecasts  for  prices 
published  in the  Greenbooks  prepared  by  the  staff  of 
the  Board  of Governors  prior  to each  FOMC  meeting 
4 These  factors  included  such  items  as  employment  costs, 
energy  prices,  food  prices,  price  controls  and  decontrols,  car 
prices,  steel  prices,  strikes,  industry  desires  to  improve  or pro- 
tect  profit  margins  and  worker  desires  to  restore  real  incomes, 
etc. 
over  the  1972-82  time  period.  Over  the  1972-82  time 
period,  118 separate  forecasts  for the  price  level  and 
general  business  conditions  were  made,  an  average 
of almost  11 forecasts  per  year.  The  forecasts  for the 
implicit  deflator  for GNP  will be analyzed  below.  The 
analysis is primarily  concerned  with  the  accuracy  with 
which  the  forecasts  predicted  the  direction  of infla- 
tion:  that  is, whether  it would  rise or fall. The  reason 
for  this  primary  concern  relates  to  the  nature  of 
policymaking.  Since  policymakers  are naturally  sen- 
sitive  to  the  potential  short-run  costs  of  efforts  to 
restrain  inflation,  there  is a risk  that  they  may  opt 
for  too  lenient  (restrictive)  policies  if the  inflation  is 
incorrectly  expected  to subside  (increase)  on its own. 
Each  Greenbook  forecast  included  estimates  for the 
prior  quarter,  the  current  quarter,  and projections  for 
a varying  number  of  quarters  into  the  future.  The 
lengths  of  the  forecasts  varied  from  zero  (two 
forecasts,  dropped  from  the  analysis)  to  eight  (one 
forecast)  quarters  into  the  future.  Most  of  the 
forecasts  had an horizon  of four to six quarters.  These 
forecasts  are  depicted  in  Charts  1 to  3. 
Charts 1-3  For  expositional  clarity  the  plots  of the 
forecasts  are  distributed  among  three  charts.  The 
charts  are  indexed  along  two  dimensions.  First,  the 
charts  are  indexed  by  the  month  of  the  quarter  in 
which  the  forecast  was made.  Chart  1, for example, 
shows  forecasts  made  in  the  first  month  of  the 
quarter,  Chart  2 includes  forecasts  made  in the  sec- 
ond  month  of  the  quarter,  and  Chart  3  shows 
forecasts  made  in  the  third  month  of  the  quarter. 
Second,  the  charts  are indexed  by time  period,.  Sec- 
tion  (a)  of  the  charts  shows  forecasts  made  during 
the  period  from  the  first  quarter  of  1972  (1972:1) 
to the  first quarter  of  1976  (1976:1),  the  (b) sections 
show  forecasts  made  during  1976:1  to  1980:1,  and 
the  (c)  sections  show  forecasts  made  in  1980:1- 
1982:4. 
The  white  line  on  each  chart  shows  the  annual- 
ized  quarterly  rate  of change  of the  implicit  deflator 
for  GNP  as  estimated  two  quarters  after  the  date 
shown.5  The  thin  black  lines  show  the  Greenbook 
forecasts.  Every  forecast  began  with  an estimate  of 
5 For  example,  the  rate  shown  for  the  first  quarter  of  1973  is 
the  rate  estimated  for that  quarter  as of the  third  quarter  of 1973. 
The  data  for  the  GNP  and  related  accounts  are revised  several 
times,  often  substantially,  after  their  original  release.  In  order 
to  provide  a consistent  series,  and  to  be  fair  to  the  forecasters 
who  were  basing  their  forecasts  on  what  they  thought  was 
historical  data.  the  “actual”  implicit  deflator  series  used  in this 
article  ignores  revisions  made  after  two  quarters.  There  are 
substantial  differences,  therefore,  between  the  “actual”  rates  of 
increase  in the  implicit  deflator  in  1972-82  in the  charts  and  the 
final  official  estimates. 
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that  in which  the  forecast  was  made,  so the  line  de- 
picting  a forecast  made  in  any  one  quarter  always 
begins  in  the  previous  quarter. 
The  forecast  made  in January  1974,  for  example, 
contained  the  following projections  for the  annualized 
quarter-by-quarter  rate  of  increase  in  the  implicit 
deflator  in the  1973:4  to  1974:4  time  period:  7.8%, 
8.1%,  6.9%,  5.5%,  and  6.0%.  The  numbers  repre- 
senting  this forecast  are plotted  as the  thin  black  lime, 
denoted  by  an  arrow,  in  the  middle  of  Chart  1. 
The  projections  for  the  prior  quarter  tended, 
because  of better  availability  of data,  to  be  closer  to 
the  actual  the  later  in the  quarter  they  were  made. 
Since  the  Greenbooks  were  usually  prepared  early  in 
the  month,  the  first-month-of-quarter  forecasts  were 
usually  prepared  before  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Commerce  released  the  preliminary  estimates  for 
GNP  and  related  accounts  in  the  prior  quarter. 
The  second-month-of-quarter  Greenbook  forecasts, 
however,  could  incorporate  the  Commerce  Depart- 
ment’s  preliminary  estimates  for  the  prior  quarter, 
and the  third-month-of-quarter  forecasts  could  utilize 
the  first  revision  of  the  statistics. 
As the  charts  clearly  show,  the  forecasts  generally 
tended  to predict  subsiding  inflation,  whether  or not 
inflation  actually  subsided.  The  charts  show  that  the 
tendency  to  underpredict  rising  inflation  was  espe- 
cially  apparent  in the  1972:1  to  1975:1  period,  and 
that  the  tendency  continued,  albeit to a more  modest 
extent,  in the  1976: l-1980:1  period.  In contrast,  the 
forecasts  tended  to  overestimate  the  strength  of in- 
flation  in  1980:2-1983:2.6 
The  charts  also  show  clearly  that  the  inflation 
forecasts  in the  1976:1-1980:1  and  1980:2-1983:4 
periods  were  considerably  closer  to  the  mark  than 
the  forecasts  for  inflation  in  the  1972:1-1974:3 
period.  The  apparent  improvement  in  forecasting 
ability  after  1974:3  may  indicate  that  the  forecasters 
were  able to model  inflation  better  after  having  been 
able  to  evaluate  the  effects  of  oil  and  food  shocks 
on the  economy  in 1972:1-1974:3.  It may,  however, 
merely  indicate  that  economic  conditions  and  infla- 
tion were  particularly  difficult to evaluate  in the  earlier 
period. 
6  It  should  be  noted  that  underpredicting  inflation  when  its 
permanent  component  is rising,  and  overpredicting  it when  its 
permanent  component  is falling, need  not  reflect  poor  forecasting 
procedures.  John  Muth  [7] showed  that  for  a series  generated 
by  unobservable  permanent  and  transitory  components,  the 
optimal  forecasting  technique  would  tend  to systematically  under- 
predict  any rise or fall in the  permanent  component,  approaching 
the  correct  forecast  asymptotically. 
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ticle is not particularly  concerned  with examining  how 
well  the  actual  rate  of inflation  was predicted  in any 
one  quarter.  Its  concern,  rather,  is  how  well  the 
forecasts  capture  the  outlook  for increasing  (decreas- 
ing)  inflation  over  the  forecast  horizon.  In  seeking 
to  answer  this  question,  the  first  step  was  to  deter- 
mine  the  slopes  of the  forecast  lines  using  a regres- 
sion  technique.  These  estimated  slopes  are,  essen- 
tially,  the  slope  of whatever  straight  line  would  best 
represent  each  thin  line  depicted  on  the  charts.  For 
example,  the  forecast  for  January  1974  has  a slope 
of  -0.62,  indicating  that  the  annualized  rate  of rise 
in  the  deflator  was  expected  to  decline  by  0.62 
percentage  points  per  quarter  on  average  over  the 
forecast  horizon  of  1973:4-1974:4. 
The  slope values for the forecasts,  described  above, 
will  be  termed  “F-slope”  values  (where  F  denotes 
forecast)  for  future  reference.  Corresponding  “A- 
slopes”  were  calculated  for the  actual  changes  in the 
deflator.  For  example,  the  A-slope  value  calculated 
from  actual  changes  in the  deflator  over  the  1973:4 
to  1974:4  time  period  was  1.07,  which  indicates  that 
the  actual  annualized  rate  of increase  in the  deflator 
was  1.07  percentage  points  per  quarter,  on average. 
Over  the  1972-82  period,  the  Greenbook  predicted 
decreasing  inflation  (negative  F-slope  values)  in 94 
out  of  118  forecasts.  Inflation  actually  decreased  in 
only  59  (exactly  one-half)  of  the  118  forecast 
horizons.  The  forecasts  correctly  anticipated  in- 
creasing  inflation  in 20 out  of its 59 occurrences  and 
incorrectly  anticipated  it (i.e.,  predicted  rising  infla- 
tion  when  inflation  actually  declined)  four  times.  In 
contrast,  the  decreasing  inflation  was predicted  cor- 
rectly  in  55  of  59  occurrences. 
Chart  4 shows  the  scatter  diagram  of  the  118  F- 
slopes  and  A-slopes.  The  F-slopes  are  plotted  from 
the  horizontal  axis and  the  A-slopes  are plotted  from 
the  vertical  axis. Thus,  if the  sign of the  A-slope  was 
predicted  correctly  in a particular  forecast,  the  point 
representing  that  forecast  would  be in the  first ( + , +) 
or  third  (-,-)  quadrant  of  the  graph.  If the  rising 
inflation  were  incorrectly  expected  to  subside,  the 
point  would  be  plotted  in  the  second  (-,+) 
quadrant,  while  if subsiding  inflation  were  incorrectly 
expected  to  rise,  that  point  would  be  plotted  in the 
fourth  ( + , -)  quadrant.  Different  symbols  are  used 
in the  scatter  diagram  to show whether  a forecast  was 
made  in  1972-76,  1976-80,  or  1980-82. 
The  scatter  diagram  clearly  confirms  the  previous 
assertions  about  Charts  l-3,  namely,  that  the  infla- 
tion  forecasts  were  least  accurate  in  the  1972-76 
period.  The  black  dots,  which  are used  to depict  the 
earlier  forecasts,  are  the  outliers  in the  second  and 
fourth  quadrants  of  the  diagram. 
Chart  4 
F-SLOPES VS. A-SLOPES 
Jan. ‘72-Dec. ‘82 
Forecast  Errors 
Table  I presents  a statistical  analysis  of the  Green- 
book forecasts  and  compares  them  to forecasts  made 
by  two  major  private  econometric  forecasting  firms.7 
The  table  uses  standard  measures  of  forecast  ac- 
curacy,  root  mean  squared  errors  and  mean  absolute 
errors,8  to  evaluate  the  relative  accuracy  of  the 
Greenbook F-slope  values  in  periods  of  rising  and 
subsiding  inflation,  respectively.  It then  compares  the 
Greenbook’s performance  to  the  performance  of  the 
two  private  firms  and  the  Richmond  quarterly  con- 
sensus  to  determine  whether  there  was  anything 
markedly  unusual  about  the Greenbook  performance 
in  relation  to  other  forecasters. 
The  first  two  rows  of  the  table  compare  F-slope 
values  to A-slope  when  the  data  were  separated  into 
periods  of  rising  inflation  (positive  A-slopes)  and 
periods  of subsiding  inflation  (negative  A-slopes).  The 
root  mean  squared  and  mean  absolute  errors  are 
shown  to be  roughly  two  and  one-half  times  as large 
when  inflation  is actually  rising as when  it is subsiding. 
The  last  column  of  Table I  shows  the  number  of 
times  that  the  sign  of  the  A-slope  was  predicted 
7  Stephen  McNees  kindly  provided  the  historical  series  on  the 
forecasts  made  by  the  private  forecasting  firms. 
8 The  root  mean  squared  error  is  calculated  by  finding  the 
difference  between  the  F-slope  and  A-slope  values  for  each 
forecast,  squaring  the  differences,  averaging  the  squared  differ- 
ences,  and  finding  the  square  root  of  the  average  squared 
difference.  The  mean  absolute  error  is calculated  by giving  each 
difference  a positive  sign  and  then  averaging  those  differences. 
A set  of perfect  forecasts  would  have  a root  mean  squared  error 
and  a mean  absolute  error  of  zero. 
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COMPARISON  OF BOARD  STAFF  (GREENBOOK)  FORECASTS  OF THE  OUTLOOK 
FOR  INCREASING  OR DECREASING  INFLATION*  TO THOSE  OF TWO  PRIVATE 
ECONOMETRIC  FORECASTING  FIRMS  AND  THE  CONSENSUS  FORECAST 
PUBLISHED  IN  THE  BUSINESS  FORECASTS  BOOKLET 
(Includes  Forecasts  Made  Between  January  1972  and  December  1982) 
l  The price index forecasted is the Implicit Price Deflator for GNP. The forecasters estimated the annual percentage 
rate of increase in the deflator for the quarters in the forecast horizon. These forecasts were regressed on a quarterly 
time  trend,  and the  statistical  analyses shown above were applied  to the  slopes of the  regression lines. 
correctly.  The  sign  was  predicted  correctly  much 
more  often  when  inflation  was  actually  subsiding. 
The  information  in the  remaining  rows  of Table  I 
provides  a comparison  of Greenbook  forecasts  to those 
made  by  two  private  forecasting  services  and  to  the 
consensus  of quarter-by-quarter  forecasts  published 
annually  in the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Richmond’s 
Business Forecasts booklets  during  the  1972-82  time 
period.  The  private  services  did  not  forecast  on  a 
month-by-month  basis,  nor  did the  monthly  publica- 
tion  dates  of  their  forecasts  correspond,  so  it  was 
necessary  to  devise  a Greenbook match  for  each  ser- 
vice  that  would  correspond  to the  forecasts  made  by 
the  service.  A  different  Greenbook match  was  also 
necessary  for  the  consensus  forecast,  as  it  was 
published  only  once  per  year. 
Table  I  shows  that  the Greenbook  forecasts  have 
lower  root  mean  squared  and  mean  absolute  errors 
than  the  forecasts  made  by  the  services,  regardless 
of whether  inflation  is rising  or subsiding.  The  table 
also  shows  that  while  the Greenbook  forecasts  have 
only  slightly  lower  error  statistics  than  the  services 
when  inflation  is rising,  they  have  substantially  lower 
error  statistics  when  inflation  is  subsiding. 
The  table  also shows  that  the  Board 
staff forecasts  had  lower  error  statistics 
than  the Business  Forecasts  consensus. 
Since  there  were  only  11 of  the  con- 
sensus  forecasts,  they  were  not  split 
into  periods  of increasing  and  decreas- 
ing  inflation. 
The  analysis  shown  in Table  I thus 
shows  clearly  that  the Greenbook 
forecasts  were  no  worse  than  those 
made  by  the  forecasting  services  in 
predicting  worsening  inflation  and 
clearly  better  than  the  services  in 
predicting  decreases  in inflation.  It also 
shows  that  all the  forecasters  studied 
were  relatively  less  accurate  in  pre- 
dicting  rising  inflation.9 
As noted  earlier,  a visual comparison 
of the  charts  indicated  that  the Green- 
book  forecasts  seemed  to  be  further 
from  the  mark  in the  1972-76  period 
than  in  the  1976-80  period.  Table  II 
shows  the  results  of an analysis  of the 
differences  in the  forecasts  during  the 
rising  inflation  portion  of the  two  time 
periods.  The  table  confirms  the  con- 
clusion  of  the  visual  inspection.  The 
root  mean  squared  and  mean  absolute 
errors  from  July  1972  to  March  1974 
(the period  of increasing  inflation  in 1972-76)  are over 
three  and  a third  times  higher  than  they  are  in the 
February  1976  to November  1979  period.  Table  II 
also  shows,  however,  that  the Greenbook  forecasts 
were  modestly  more  accurate  than  the two competing 
forecasts  in  each  time  period. 
The Greenbook  forecasts  actually  predicted  rising 
inflation  accurately  only  slightly  less frequently  in the 
July  1972  to  March  1974  period  (7 of 21  episodes, 
33  percent  of the  time),  than  in the  February  1976 
to  November  1979  period  (16  of  43  episodes,  37 
percent  of the  time).  The  lower  root  mean  squared 
errors  for the  later period,  therefore,  stem  more  from 
smaller  misses  in predicting  the  magnitude  of the  rise 
than  from  relatively  fewer  accurate  predictions  of the 
direction  of  inflation. 
9  The  mean  error  statistics  from  this  Bank’s  quarterly  consen- 
sus series  and from  other  analyses  show  that  forecasters  in general 
tended  to underestimate  inflation  in the  seventies  (see-reference 
to McNees  [8] and  Zarnowitz  [11] in Karamouzis  and  Lombra’s 
interesting  study  of Federal  Reserve  policymaking  and forecasting 
16, p.  12].  See  also  McNees  (9,  p.  18]). 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  9 Table  II 
EVALUATION  OF  BOARD  STAFF  (GREENBOOK)  FORECASTS  OF THE  OUTLOOK 
FOR  INFLATION*  IN  DIFFERENT  TIME  PERIODS  AND  A  COMPARISON  OF 
STAFF  FORECASTS  TO THOSE  OF TWO  PRIVATE  ECONOMETRIC 
FORECASTING  SERVICES 
*  The price index forecasted is the Implicit  Price Deflator for GNP. The forecasters  estimated  theannual  percentage 
rate of increase in the deflator for the quarters in the forecast horizon. These forecasts were regressed on a quarterly 
time  trend,  and the  statistical  analyses shown above were applied  to the  slopes of the  regression lines. 
Possible Reasons  for Mispredicting 
Rising  Inflation 
The  discussion  in this  section  attempts  to evaluate 
three  competing  hypotheses  that,  taken  individ- 
ually  or  taken  together,  could  explain  the  apparent 
difficulty  that  forecasters  experienced  in predicting 
rising  inflation. 
Proposed  Hypotheses 
1.  Unpredictable  supply shocks  The  inflation  pre- 
diction  errors  resulted  from  unforeseen  shocks  to 
aggregate  supply  such  as the  OPEC  oil embargo,  crop 
failures,  etc. 
2.  Tendency to underutilize  the economic theory of the 
inflationary  process  The  overall  inflationary  process 
was perceived  as a series  of supply  shocks,  so money 
growth  was  given  insufficient  attention. 
3. Money growth in excess  of that targeted  The  Green- 
book and  perhaps  other  forecasts  assumed  that  the 
money  supply  would  grow  at  the  longer-run  target 
rates  previously  set  by  the  Federal  Open  Market 
Committee  (FOMC),  so the  inaccuracy  of the  pro- 
jections  stemmed  from  actual  money  growth  ex- 
ceeding  its target  range  over  several  sustained  periods 
in  the  seventies. 
Evaluation  of  the 
Proposed  Hypotheses 
1.  Unpredictable supply shocks  This 
hypothesis  undoubtedly  explains  some 
of  the  forecasting  errors.  As  noted  in 
footnote  six,  John  Muth  [7]  showed 
that,  as a statistical  matter,  if the  move 
ment  in  a  series  over  time  was  com- 
posed  of  transitory  and  permanent 
components  that  were  not  separable  ex 
ante, the  optimal  forecasting  technique 
would  underpredict  the  series when  the 
permanent  component  was  rising  and 
overpredict  it  when  the  permanent 
component  was  falling.  As  the  charts 
showed,  that  pattern  of  forecast  error 
describes  the  staff forecasts  during  the 
1972-82  period,  as inflation  was under- 
predicted  in  1972-74  and  1976-80  and 
overpredicted  in  1980-82. 
A brief  review  of supply  shocks  and 
their  effects  on staff forecasts  in the  two 
periods  of  sharply  rising  inflation, 
1972-74  and  1976-80,  follows. 
1972-74  The  inflation  of  1972-74 
was well under  way before  the  imposi- 
tion  of  the  OPEC  oil  embargo  in 
October  1973.  The  Nixon  administration  had  im- 
posed  a wage/price  freeze  in August  1971  followed 
by  a more  flexible  wage  and  price  control  program 
lasting  from  November  1971  to January  1973,  when 
it was replaced  by an even  more  flexible  program  that 
ran  through  June  1973.  This  last  program  was  par- 
ticularly  ineffective,  as the  wholesale  price  index  in- 
creased  at  a 24  percent  annual  rate  during  the  five 
months  of the  program,  and  by  the  end  of the  pro- 
gram  (June),  the  Consumer  Price  Index  was  rising 
at  about  a  10  percent  annual  rate. 
The  rate  of money  growth,  however,  had  slowed 
in the  first half of  1973 from  the  extraordinarily  rapid 
rates  of  growth  registered  in  1972  (the  slowing  in 
money  growth  rates  continued  through  the  first 
quarter  of  1975).  There  was  thus  a  general  belief 
during  the  second  and  third  quarters  of  1973  that 
the  economy  was  cooling  and  inflation  was  begin- 
ning  to  subside.  Thus,  it  was  understandable,  for 
example,  when  in  April  1973  the  Greenbook began 
to  predict  decreasing  inflation  on  the  grounds  that 
price  pressures  would  subside  once  the  changes  in 
the  price  control  program  had  worked  through  the 
economy. 
In  theory,  the  imposition  of  the  oil  embargo  in 
October  1973 and the  consequent  oil shortage  should 
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combined  with  a reduction  in output.  Such  probably 
would  have  been  the  case  had  the  economy  not 
previously  been  in  a  period  of  general  inflation. 
Because  it  was  in  such  a  situation,  however,  infla- 
tionary  expectations  rose,  and  even  though  the  rate 
of money  growth  was slowing,  it was apparently  suf- 
ficient  to  fuel  continued  increases  in  inflation  until 
the  third  quarter  of  1974. 
1976-80  The  inflation  of  1976-80  was  less 
influenced  by  unforeseen  oil  shocks,  although  un- 
doubtedly  the  January  1979  Iranian  revolution  (and 
probably  the  shortages  resulting  from  the  Department 
of Energy’s  fuel allocation  program)  affected  the  price 
level  in  the  first  half  of  1979.  In  any  event,  it  is 
difficult  to determine  whether  the  major  impetus  for 
the  rising  inflation  in  1979  stemmed  from  the  oil 
shortages  or  from  prior  excess  money  growth  and 
already  rising  inflationary  expectations.10 
Evaluation  As was shown  in Table  II, the  inflation 
forecasts  for  the  1976-80  period  were  closer  to  the 
mark  than  the  forecasts  made  in  1972-74.  Thus, 
although  it  is  difficult  to  confirm,  the  oil  shocks 
probably  did  affect  the  accuracy  of  the  forecasts  to 
a large  extent  in the  1972-74  period,  This  does  not 
mean,  however,  that  the  unforeseen  oil  shock 
wholly  explains  the  tendency  to  mispredict  rising 
inflation,  for that  tendency  was apparent  both  before 
and after the  announcement  of the  1973  oil embargo, 
and it was apparent  in the  1976-80  period  both  before 
and  after  the  Iranian  revolution  oil  shock. 
2. Underutilizing  the  economic theory of inflation as a 
monetary  phenomenon  Nearly  all  forecasters  in  the 
seventies  routinely  cited  nonmonetary  factors  (supply 
shocks,  etc.)  in  rationalizing  their  respective  infla- 
tion  forecasts.  For  example,  the Greenbook cited  such 
developments  as expected  changes  in the  minimum 
wage,  unusual  weather,  and  various  fuel  price 
increases”  in explaining  its forecasts.  Among  other 
10 Stephen  Axilrod  observed  that  “Growth  of M1  failed  to  slow 
over  the  first  three  quarters  of  1979.  At  the  same  time,  prices 
were  placed  under  additional  upward  pressure  by the  second  oil 
shock  in  the  early  part  of  the  year.  Overall  price  increases 
moved  into  the  double  digit area. That  had  also occurred  in  1974, 
but  in  the  earlier  period  there  had  been  less  of  a  buildup  in 
inflationary  expectations  and  less  of an erosion  in the  credibility 
of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  will  and  capacity  to  control  the  situ- 
ation”  (2,  p.  16]. 
11 A complete  list of relevant  staff commentary  on inflation  from 
Greenbook published  between  April  1972  and  December  1982 
and  the  numerical  staff  forecasts  for  the  rate  of increase  in  the 
implicit  deflator  for  GNP  made  between  January  1972  and 
December  1982 are available  from  the  author  upon  request.  The 
commentary  demonstrates  that  nonmonetary  factors  were  fre- 
quently  used  to  explain  the  inflation  forecasts. 
forecasters,  Walter  Heller  and  George  Perry  refer- 
red to a“.  . . chronic  cost-push  rate  of about  6 per- 
cent  per  year”  [5, p.1],  and  Albert  Sommers  stated 
as  the  consensus  of  the  Conference  Board’s  1978 
Economic  Forum,  “We  are  experiencing  structural 
inflation,  not  cyclical  inflation”  (10,  p.  7]. 
The  emphasis  given  to  these  nonmonetary  ex- 
planations  of  inflation  may  have  diverted  attention 
away  from  the  effects  of past  growth  in the  money 
supply  on  observed  inflation  rates  in  both  the 
1972-74  and  1976-80  periods,  and  hence  may  have 
contributed  to the  forecast  errors  in the  two periods. 
The  relevant  issue  here  is whether  the  permanent 
component  of inflation  in the  seventies  was predict- 
able  ex ante  (see  the  discussion  of Muth  [7] above). 
From  the  viewpoint  of the  theory  that  inflation  is a 
monetary  phenomenon,  the  permanent  component 
of the  rate  of growth  of the  price  level  should  be ex- 
plained  by past  rates  of growth  of money.  Excessive 
reliance  on  nonmonetary  factors  to  explain  inflation 
thus  may  have  contributed  to  the  errors  in inflation 
predictions  by  diverting  attention  from  prior 
movements  in  money  growth. 
3.  Money growth  in excess of that  targeted  A third 
hypothesis  is that  the  forecast  errors  resulted,  at least 
in  part,  from  actual  money  growth  exceeding  the 
Federal  Reserve’s  monetary  targets  during  periods 
of  mounting  inflationary  pressure  (especially  in the 
late  seventies).  As  Stephen  Axilrod,  former  Staff 
Director  for  Monetary  and  Financial  Policy  at  the 
Federal  Reserve,  observed: 
In  1977 and  1978,  M1  had  accelerated  to a pace  of slightly 
more  than  8 percent  per  year,  after  growing  by  an  average 
of  5%  percent  per  year  over  the  previous  two  years.  Not 
only  did  this  acceleration  itself  appear  to  signal  that  policy 
was  becoming  more  expansionary,  but  also  the  credibility 
of policy  was  being  eroded  by  the  consistency  with  which 
actual  M1  growth  came  in above  adopted  target  ranges  in 
a  strong  economy.  This  psychological  effect  was  made 
even  worse  in  the  circumstances  of  the  time  by  the  fact 
that  new  one-year  target  ranges  were  adopted  quarterly, 
with  the  most  recent  quarter  serving  as a base  . . . and  with 
no  apparent  effort  to  make  up  for  the  preceding  over 
shoots.  This  became  known  as  “base  drift.”  The  erosion 
of credibility  because  the  targets  were  missed  and  because 
the  process  of  target  setting  also  led  to  a perception  that 
the  targets  were  perhaps  not  serious  constraints  fueled 
inflationary  expectations  [2,  p.  15]. 
The  1977-80  time  period  coincides  with.  the 
second  period  of rising  inflation  depicted  in section 
(b) of Charts  1 to  3.  During  that  period  the  average 
year-by-year  money  growth  was  7.2  percent,  while 
the  average  announced  target  range  was  4.25  per- 
cent  to  6.75  percent  (derived  from  Broaddus  and 
Goodfriend  [3, p.7]).  Monetarists  would  argue  that 
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growth  and  the  period  of  inflationary  buildup  was 
not  due  to chance,  since  excess  money  growth  fuels 
inflation. 
As the  Greenbook  forecasts  routinely  assumed  future 
money  growth  at the  midpoint  of the  System’s  stated 
target  range,  it can be  argued  that  the  monetary  over- 
shoots  were  partially  responsible  for  the  Greenbook 
forecast  errors.  Still,  the  Greenbook  forecasts  were  no 
worse  than  the private  forecasts,  which  were  not  con- 
strained  to  accept  announced  monetary  targets.  Of 
course,  the  extent  to which  the  private  forecasts  were 
influenced  by  the  Federal  Reserve’s  announced 
monetary  targets  is not  known,  but  it  seems  likely 
that  the  targets  had  some  influence.  Thus,  although 
the  missed  money  growth  target  hypothesis  cannot 
be  confirmed  as  a source  of  forecast  error,  neither 
can  it  be  dismissed. 
Conclusions 
This  study  demonstrated  that  rising  inflation  was 
difficult  to  forecast  in  the  seventies.  The  analysis 
indicated  that  both  the  forecasts  contained  in  the 
Federal  Reserve’s  Greenbook  and  those  prepared  by 
other  prominent  forecasters  tended  to  mispredict 
rising  inflation  during  the  two  episodes  of  sharply 
rising inflation  in the  decade,  although  the  forecasting 
performances  did  improve  somewhat  in the  second 
episode,  between  1976  and  1980.  The  article  also 
noted  that  forecasters  tended  to overpredict  inflation 
somewhat  in  the  early  eighties  when  it  began  to 
diminish. 
The  article  discussed  three  possible  explanations 
for  the  forecast  errors:  1)  unpredictable  supply 
shocks,  2)  excessive  attention  to  nonmonetary 
developments  affecting  the  price  level  and  insuffi- 
cient  attention  to past  money  growth,  and  3) actual 
money  growth  coming  in above  target  in the  seven- 
ties.  The  discussion  concluded  that  none  of the  ex- 
planations  could  be  ruled  out. 
The  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  the  inflation  fore- 
casting  experience  of  the  seventies  is  that  rising 
inflation  is insidious  and  difficult  to  recognize.  The 
past,  however,  is  not  necessarily  prologue  to  the 
future.  Forecasters,  like  everyone  else,  learn  from 
their  experiences.  Virtually  all forecasters-those  at 
the  Federal  Reserve  and  elsewhere-are  making 
strong  efforts  to improve  on the  inflation  forecasting 
performance  of  the  seventies  and  early  eighties.  It 
is hoped  that  this  paper,  by  reviewing  the  earlier  ex- 
perience  in some  detail,  will contribute  to this  effort. 
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